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Schauer: Has Precedent Ever Really Mattered in the Supreme Court?

HAS PRECEDENT EVER REALLY MATTERED IN
IN
THE SUPREME
SUPREME COURT?
Frederick Schauer·
Schauer*
INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION

The doctrine of precedent
precedent is in the news. In the last year, and
especially
especially from the close of the Supreme Court's 2006 Term to the
present, various academic, quasi-academic,
quasi-academic, and non-academic
non-academic commentators
have
been
criticizing
the
Roberts
Court
for disregarding
disregarding
mentators
precedent.'
commentators, the Roberts Court has abdicated
abdicated
precedent. I For these commentators,
its duty as
as a court to treat its earlier decisions
decisions with something close
to conclusive respect, and to do so regardless of the views of the
current
earlier decisions.22
current Justices about the wisdom of those earlier
Although the Supreme Court of the United
United States
States claims to follow

*• Frank
Frank Stanton
Amendment, John
John F.
F. Kennedy
Kennedy School
School of
Stanton Professor
Professor of
of the
the First
First Amendment,
of Government,
Government,
Harvard
Harvard University, and George
George Eastman
Eastman Professor
Professor (2007-2008) and Fellow of Balliol College, Oxford
University. This Article is the written version
version of the 41st Henry
Henry J.
1. Miller Lecture,
Lecture, delivered
delivered at the
Georgia State University College
College of Law on September
September 10, 2007. 1I am grateful
grateful to Henry Monaghan,
Monaghan,
Carol Steiker, Matthew Stephenson, William Stuntz, Laurence
Laurence Tribe, Mark Tushnet, and Lloyd Weinreb
for references to cases
cases and secondary
secondary literature, to the faculty at Georgia
Georgia State University for their
probing questions,
questions, to Bill Edmundson
Edmundson for an extremely helpful written
written commentary,
commentary, and to Bobbie
Spellman
Spellman for useful discussion about the concept of precedent and its relation
relation to human
human thinking,
reasoning, and decision-making.
decision-making.
commentary has been, in part, fueled
\.1. The intense commentary
fueled by the Court's own explicit attention to the
issue. See, e.g.,
Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2704 (2007)
e.g., Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc.,
(2007) (Souter,
J., dissenting) (stating that the Court suffers when "important
"important precedent
precedent is overturned without good
2737 (2007) (Breyer, J.,
reason"); Leegin Creative
Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2737
overturning longstanding
dissenting) (arguing that no new or changed conditions existed to justify
justify overturning
precedent); Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618,
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (objecting to
precedent);
2618, 2649 (2007)
(2007) (Stevens,
1769, 1781 (2007)
J.,
(2007) (Breyer, 1.,
majority's disregard
disregard of relevant precedent); Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769,
concurring) (concluding that stare decisis concerns
concerns are weakest when a rule concerns only judges
judges and
Ct. 2479, 2503 (2006) (Thomas, J.,
when there has been little reliance); Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct.
concurring) (the "court has never
constrained to follow precedent"
[
concurring)
never felt constrained
precedent" when based on "unworkable
"unworkable or 0
U.S. 808, 827)).
badly reasoned"
reasoned" decisions
decisions (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S.
827».
2. For a prominent
Denied,N.Y. TIMES,
prominent example, see Editorial, Justice
Justice Denied,
TiMES, July 5, 2007,
2007, at 12. See also
Phalanx,N.Y. REV.
Ronald Dworkin, The Supreme Court
Court Phalanx,
REv. BOOKS,
BOOKS, Sept. 27, 2007, at 92; Charles Lane,
Narrow
Victories Move Roberts Court
Decisions Ignore
Ignore Precedent,
Contend,
Narrow Victories
Court to Right; Decisions
Precedent, Liberal
Liberal Justices
Justices Contend,
WASH. POST,
POST, June 29, 2007, at A4; Dorothy
Dorothy Samuels, Reflections on the New Abortion Ruling and the
Roberts Court,
27, 2007, at 26; Geoffrey R. Stone, Our
Court, N.Y. TIMES,
Our Faith-Based
TiMES, Apr. 27,2007,
Faith-Based Justices,
Justices, CHI.
TRIB.,
30, 2007, at 19.
TRIB., Apr. 30,2007,
19.
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precedent, 3 and although
precedent,3
although the Justices
Justices write their opinions as if they
they
4
were following precedent,
precedent,4 the Supreme Court's supposed obligation
to follow precedent has not traditionally
traditionally been treated by commentators-academic and non-academic
mentators-academic
non-academic alike-as something to be
taken very seriously. 5 And insofar as the public cares what the
Supreme
Supreme Court does, itself a debatable proposition,
proposition,66 the public seems
largely unaware of the idea of precedent, and seems equally unconcerned with whether the Supreme Court follows it or not. When the
public agrees with the Court's outcomes, it appears to have little
interest in how the Court got there, and when the public disagrees
of
with those outcomes, it becomes no more interested in questions of
methodology. Indeed,
methodology_
Indeed, much the same can be said about elected
elected
officials, who, as Michael
Michael Dukakis discovered to his detriment in
7
seldom
receive
any political credit for following precedent or
or
1988,
1988,
precedent is in support of an
praising those who do, at least if the precedent
otherwise
otherwise unpopular substantive outcome or policy. At the same
criticism for
time, public officials are equally
equally seldom subject to criticism
disregarding
judicial
precedent
in
the
service
of
politically
politically popular
disregarding judicial precedent
8
precedent just
policies. For politicians and the public, following a precedent
because
precedent seems hardly to matter at all.
because of its status as a precedent
3. See Parents
Parents Involved in Cmty.
Cmty. Schs.
Schs. v. Seallie
Seattle Sch. Dist.
Dist. No.1,
No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2766, 2800,
2835 (2007),
(2007), the most recent of countless Supreme Court cases in which both the majority and
claimed explicitly to rely on precedent
disregarding
dissenting opinions claimed
precedent while accusing the other side of disregarding
it.
4. Indeed,
Indeed, this is often most apparent in those cases in which even
even patent departures from precedent
precedent
are written as if they were
were based on the very precedents that are being essentially
essentially overruled.
overruled. E.g.,
Brandenburg
(1969) (per curiam).
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 450 (1969)
5. See Henry P. Monaghan,
Taking Supreme Court
Court Opinions
Opinions Seriously,
1, I1 (1979).
Monaghan, Taking
Seriously, 39 MD.
MD. L. REV.
REv. I,
(1979).
6. See Frederick
Frederick Schauer, Foreword:
Foreword: The Court's
Court'sAgenda - and the Nation's,
REV. 4,
Nation's, 120 HARV.
HARv. L. REv.
21(2006).
21 (2006).
7. When asked during the 1988
1988 Presidential campaign
campaign why, as Governor
Governor of Massachusetts,
Massachusetts, he had
vetoed a bill requiring public school teachers to say the Pledge of Allegiance in class, Dukakis
Dukakis
responded
responded that the existing case
case law mandated his veto, a response widely taken at the time to be a
significant
26
significant political
political gaffe. See Frederick
Frederick Schauer, Ambivalence About the Law, 49 ARIZ. L. REV.
REv. 11,
11,26
(2007).
(2007).
8. A good example comes
comes from the Flag Protection Act of 1989, passed overwhelmingly
overwhelmingly by
Congress
Congress almost
almost immediately
immediately after the Supreme
Supreme Court's decision in Texas v.v. Johnson,
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420
(1989),
invalidating state flag desecration laws. Given the decision
Johnson, it came
came as no surprise
(1989), invalidating
decision in Johnson,
when
Protection Act was invalidated
Eichman, 496 U.S. 310,
States v. Eichman,
when the Flag Protection
invalidated by the Court in United States
(1990). Foreshadowing
Justice
318-19 (1990).
Foreshadowing what is to come in this article, it is worth noting that Chief Justice
Rehnquist
Justices O'Connor, White, and Stevens, all of whom dissented
dissented in Johnson,
Johnson, persisted in
Rehnquist and Justices
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of
Some of the seeming
seeming previous unconcern
unconcern for the constraints of
precedent, especially
especially in the academic and serious non-academic
non-academic
literature, is very
very likely a function of the Warren Court and its legacy.
Ohio,9
Many of the Warren
Warren Court's landmark rulings, including Mapp v. Ohio,
0
Baker v. Carr,10
Carr,' New York Times Co.
Co. v. Sullivan,'
Sullivan,111 and, most famously,
12
Education, were unmistakable
Brown v. Board
Board of Education,12
unmistakable rejections of the
the
Court's earlier precedents. For those with substantive sympathy with
understandable that little
these and other Warren Court outcomes, it is understandable
little
would
have
been spent emphasizing the virtues of stare decisis in
time
in
precedential constraint in general.
particular and precedential
But now the situation appears to be different, and there has
emerged a growing criticism
criticism of the Supreme Court for rejecting the
conclusions
conclusions of the Court's previous rulings. Some of this change in
the tone of commentary about the Supreme
Supreme Court seems plainly
plainly a
function of political shifts, but couching substantive criticism
criticism in the
language of judicial
judicial methodology
methodology seems dissonant, for it is not clear
methodological or institutional
that second-order
second-order procedural or methodological
constraints on preferred substantive
substantive first-order outcomes have ever
ever
had much purchase
purchase in American
American constitutional
constitutional or political debate.
The willingness to condemn judicial
judicial outcomes
outcomes that would have been
been
preferred
on
political
grounds
or
had
been
reached
by
the
elected
preferred
elected
1 3 and
branches
government was a staple of the "neutral
branches of government
"neutral principles9
principles,,13
and
also Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 435-36 (2000)
dissent in Eichman.
Eichman. See also
(2000) (making
(making clear
1968 before enacting
enacting a statute intentionally designed to overrule
overrule the
that Congress
Congress hardly hesitated
hesitated in 1968
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,498-99
436,498-99 (1966)).
(1966)).
Court's decision in Miranda
9. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367
(1961) (holding
367 U.S. 643,
643, 657-58 (1961)
(holding that the exclusionary rule for illegally
obtained evidence
evidence applies in state proceedings,
proceedings, contrary
contrary to the Court's earlier
earlier holding in Wolf
Wolf v.
Colorado,338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949)).
Colorado,
(1949)).
10.
233 (1962)
10. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
186,233
(1962) (holding reapportionment
reapportionment questions justiciable and
rejecting
rejecting the contrary
contrary view of Colegrove
Colegrove v. Green,
Green, 328 U.S. 549, 555-56
555-56 (1946)).
(i 946)).
11. See New York Times Co., v. Sullivan,
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
254, 268-69 (1964)
(1964) (concluding
(concluding that state libel
proceedings
proceedings were subject
subject to First Amendment scrutiny, contrary to the statement in Beauharnais
Beauhamais v.
Illinois,
(1952), that the entirety of libel law was wholly outside the coverage
Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952),
coverage of the
First Amendment).
Amendment).
(1954) (rejecting, in the context of segregation
12. See Brown
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,494-95
483, 494-95 (1954)
"separate but equal"
in public
public schools,
schools, the "separate
equal" doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson,
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551-52
(1896)).
(1896)).
TowardNeutral
Neutral Principles
Principleso/Constitutional
of ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARv.
HARv. L. REv.
REv. 1,
1, 17
13. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward
(1959).
(1959).
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"legal process,,14
process ' 14 perspectives
1950s and 1960s, and some of
"legal
perspectives of the 1950s
of
l5
5
this carried
Wade' by those who
carried over to the early criticism of Roe v. Wade
on moral or political grounds favored what is now known as the prochoice position.'
position.1 66 But for thirty years or more such critiques have
been
substantially more unfashionable, and for that period we have
been substantially
considerable amount of what might be described as the
seen a considerable
substance over form in constitutional
constitutional criticism and
triumph of substance
constitutional theory.
constitutional
Against
unconcern for the alleged
Against this background
background of seeming unconcern
of
tempting to explain
explain the resurgence
resurgence of
constraints of precedent, it is tempting
precedent as simply
criticism of the Supreme
Supreme Court for not following precedent
political
substantive outpolitical or ideological, with critics of the Court's substantive
comes resorting to precedent as simple opportunism, using whatever
academically available to support
support
norms are politically, culturally, or academically
what is, in reality, a criticism of substance
substance and not of method. And
And
1177
perhaps
perhaps this explanation
explanation is sound. But before
before reaching such a
conclusion, and before too easily concluding
concluding that the critics of the
Roberts Court are being opportunistic
opportunistic or disingenuous, we need to
understand
precedent or to be conunderstand just what it means to follow precedent
desirable to determine whether precestrained by it. Thus, it seems desirable
generator of Supreme
constraint on or generator
dent has ever been a serious constraint
Court outcomes,
and
to
determine
whether
precedential
constraintprecedential constraintoutcomes,
at least in its stare decisis version and at least at the Supreme Court
level-is actually a good idea. Addressing
Addressing those issues is my goal
understanding the
here, for without doing so we have no hope of understanding

Beginning: The School
14. E.g., Philip B. Kurland, Brown v. Board
Board of Education
Education Was the Beginning:
Desegregation
Cases in the United States Supreme Court:
1954-1979, 1979 WASH.
(1979).
Court: 1954-1979,
WASH. U.
U. L.Q. 309 (1979).
Desegregation Cases
On the
the Legal
Legal Process
perspective generally,
see HENRY
HENRY M.
M. HART,
HART, JR.
JR. &
&ALBERT
ALBERT M.
THE LEGAL
LEGAL
Process perspective
generally, see
M. SACKS,
SACKS, THE
PROCESS: BASIC
BASIC PROBLEMS
PROBLEMS IN
IN THE
THE MAKING
MAKING AND
APPLICATION OF
OF LAW
PROCESS:
AND APPLICATION
LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. &&
Philip Frickey
Frickey eds.,
eds., 1994).
Philip
1994).
15. SeeRoev. Wade,410U.S.II3,
Wade, 410U.S. 113, 173
173 (1973).
(1973).
16. See,
most prominently,
prominently, John
John Hart Ely,
Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe
Roe v. Wade,
Wade,
16.
See, most
Ely, The Wages of
a/Crying
L.J. 920,
944-45 (1973).
(1973).
82 YALE LJ.
920, 923,
923, 944--45
17. And
also there
nothing wrong
wrong with
taking the
substantive outcomes
be expected
expected by
17.
And perhaps
perhaps also
there isis nothing
with taking
the substantive
outcomes toto be
by
one
one or
or another
another stance about judicial
judicial method as aa reason
reason for
for praising
praising or condemning that
that method. See
generally
Frederick Schauer,
JudicialReview, 22
22 L. &
217 (2003).
(2003).
generally Frederick
Schauer, Neutrality
Neutrality and Judicial
& PHIL.
PHIL. 217
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recent re-emergence
re-emergence of a discourse about precedent
precedent that has not been
seen for generations.
I. STARE DECISIS-THE
DECISIS-THE BASIC IDEA

Supreme Court tends
Although the public discourse about the current Supreme
commonly
"precedent," our subject is
commonly to be couched in the language of "precedent,"
actually stare decisis. 1ls8 "Precedent"
"Precedent" is the broader term, and as it is
typically used, encompasses both vertical
vertical precedent-the
precedent-the obligation
obligation of a
"chain of
of
lower court to follow the rulings of a higher court in its own "chain
9 -and
command"'
command,,19-and horizontal precedent, the (typically non-absolute)
obligation of a court to follow its own previous decisions.22o° Because the
latter-horizontal
precedent-is what I am talking about on this occasion,
latter-horizontal precedent-is
and because
because there is no higher court for the Supreme Court of the United
States to obey, the issue of vertical precedent
precedent can be set aside, and we can
can
direct our attention to the alleged
alleged constraints of stare decisis (law Latin for
"stand by the thing decided"), the obligation
"stand
obligation of a court-any
court-any court-to
decisions.2 '
follow, at least presumptively, its own previous decisions.21
To say that a court has an obligation
obligation to follow its own previous
decisions is to say that a court has an obligation
obligation to treat the fact of a
previous decision of some question as a reason
reason for deciding it the
22
way. And thus it is no evidence of the recognition or existence
same way.22
existence
of such an obligation
for
a
court
to
make
obligation
a decision consistent
consistent with a
previous
previous decision under circumstances
circumstances in which that court or a
particular judge or Justice would have reached the same outcome
even absent the earlier decision. If I love chocolate ice cream, and if I
am ordered (by a parent, military superior, prison guard, or
18. See generally
generally Richard
Stare Decisis
Decisis and the Constitution:
Constitution: An Essay
Essay on
IS.
Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
Jr., Stare
ConstitutionalMethodology,
REV. 570 (2001); Michael
Precedent
Constitutional
Methodology, 76 N.Y.U.
N.Y.U. L. REv.
Michael J. Gerhardt,
Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent
in Constitutional
ConstitutionalDecisionmaking
Theory, 60 GEO.
68 (1991).
(1991).
in
Decisionmaking and Theory,
GEO. WASH.
WASH. L. REv. 6S
Superior Court
Court Precedents?,
Precedents?,46
STAN.
19. See Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior
Inferior Courts
Courts Obey Superior
46 STAN.
817, 841-42 (1994).
(1994).
L. REv. SI7,
S.CAL. L. REv. I,
1, 19 n.22,
20. See Larry Alexander, Constrained
Constrained by Precedent,
Precedent, 63 S.
n.22, (1989).
(19S9).
IN ENGLISH
BLACK'SS LAW
21. See RUPERT CROSS, PRECEDENT IN
ENGLISH LAW
LAW 103-25
103-25 (3d ed. 1977); BLACK'
DICTIONARY
DICTIONARY 1443 (8th
(Sth ed.
ed. 2004).
Reasons, Authority, and
and the Meaning
Meaning of "Obey":
"Obey": Further
22. See Donald H. Regan,
Regan, Reasons,
Further Thoughts on
Raz and
and Obedience
Law, 3
3 CAN.
Obedience to Law,
CAN. J.L. && JURISPRUDENCE
JURISPRUDENCE 3, 20 (1990).
(1990).
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whomever) when hungry to eat chocolate
chocolate ice cream, the fact that my
behavior is consistent with the content of the order is no evidence
evidence that
I am obeying the order, and is no evidence
evidence that the order is the reason
reason
(or even a reason) for me eating the ice cream, for it is likely I would
would
have behaved in exactly the same way even had the order not existed.
So too with judges and precedent. In his majority opinion in Davis
Davis
24 in
23
v. Washington,23
Washington, Justice Scalia cited Crawford
in
Crawford v. Washington
Washington24
support of the conclusion
conclusion that the prosecution
prosecution in a criminal
criminal case is
25
25
barred by the Confrontation
Confrontation Clause from using against a defendant
the out-of-court
out-of-court testimonial statements
now-unavailable witness.
statements of a now-unavailable
Yet it is clear from Justice Scalia's opinions in both Crawford
Crawford and
Davis that he would have favored the outcome in Davis
Davis
Davis even had
Crawford not been decided, just as it is apparent that Justice
Crawford
Wade266
in Roe
outcome in
the same
for the
Blackmun
Blackmun would have opted for
same outcome
Roe v.
v. Wadi
Griswold v. Connecticu?
even had Griswold
Connecticu?77 not been decided eight years
earlier. Similarly, it is plain that Justice
Justice Ginsburg
Ginsburg would have voted
Virginia Military
Military
to strike down the exclusion of women from the Virginia
28
Institute 28
even had the Court not ruled in several
previous
decisions
several
decisions
that such explicit
discrimination needed to be subject
explicit gender discrimination
subject to
considerably higher
something considerably
higher than the minimal
minimal scrutiny of the
29
29
rational
instances, and in countless
rational basis standard. In all of these instances,
others, the Justices, just as in the example of the chocolate ice cream,
are making decisions consistent with an existing
existing precedent, but it
would be a mistake to conclude that the Justices were following
precedent, obeying
precedent
obeying precedent,
precedent, or being constrained
constrained by precedent
simply because their decisions
were
consistent
with
precedent.
decisions
23.
23. See Davis v. Washington, 126 S.S. Ct. 2266, 2273 (2006).
24. Crawford
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
Crawford v. Washington,
25. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
26. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
113, 166-68 (1973).
(1973).
27. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
(1965).
28. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515,
515, 555-58 (1996).
(1996).
29. See Miss. Univ. for Women
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)
(1982) ("[T]he party seeking to uphold
statute that
that classifies
classifies individuals
individuals on
on the
the basis
of their gender
aa statute
basis of
gender must carry the burden
burden of showing
showing an
'exceedingly persuasive
v. Feenstra,
Feenstra, 450 U.S.
'exceedingly
persuasive justification'
justification' for
for the
the classification."
classification." (quoting
(quoting Kirchberg
Kirchberg v.
455, 461 (1981
(1981)));
»); Craig
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,
190, 197 (1976)
(1976) (stating "[tlo
"[t]o withstand constitutional
challenge, previous
previous cases establish that classifications
classifications by gender must serve
serve important governmental
governmental
objectives and must be substantially
objectives").
substantially related to achievement
achievement of those objectives").
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actually to follow
follow precedent
precedent is to take a precedent's
precedent's very
Thus, actually
status-its source
source and not
not its content-as
content-as aa precedent
precedent as aa reason
reason for
for
status-its
in
the
been
decided
way
as
it
had
in
the
same
the
issue
now
deciding
it
been decided
deciding
same
we can have multiple
mUltiple reasons
reasons for our
our
past. 3300 Admittedly, it is true that we
actions, so that a decision
decision in one way
way or another
another cannot conclusively,
conclusively,
whether precedential
precedential constraint
constraint was a causal factor,
by itself, tell us whether
at
times those multiple reasons
Further,
much.
if
so,
just
how
just how
reasons
and,
might point in the
cannot be sure,
sure, for example,
the same direction, so we cannot
Justice Ginsburg
Ginsburg might have voted
voted the
the way she did in the
whether Justice
31
31
VM
VMI case on the authority
authority of Mississippi
Mississippi University
University for
for Women v.
32
32 and Craig v. Boren33 had she herself disagreed as a firstHogan
Hogan
Craig
herself
order matter with what
what turned
turned out to be her opinion in that
that case.
Nevertheless,
probably more than 10,000
10,000 opinions
Nevertheless, over the course
course of probably
in certainly
certainly more than 6000 Supreme Court decisions
decisions over the last
Warren Court era), we would
fifty-five years (the beginning of the Warren
instances in which
which stare decisis
appreciable number of instances
expect an appreciable
actually
stare decisis had been a
actually determined
determined an outcome if in fact stare
genuine causal
decision-making. So
causal factor in Supreme Court decision-making.
although the existence
outcome-causing reasons makes
existence of multiple outcome-causing
disentangling
stare decisis difficult, a reliable test of the
disentangling the effect of stare
existence or force of a norm of precedent, given the size of the
existence
of
population of Supreme Court cases, would be the frequency of
instances
instances in which a Justice who would have decided a case in one
way held otherwise solely because
because of the obligation to follow
contemporary
precedent. Indeed, this is plainly what the contemporary
commentators
commentators are suggesting when they chastise the current Court for
commentators are not suggesting that
disregarding precedent. The commentators
Justice
Justice Thomas should favor affirmative
affirmative action, or that Justice Scalia
should have different views from the ones he now has about the
constitutionality of restrictions on abortion, or that Chief Justice
STAN. L. REv.
REv. 571
supra note 20; Frederick Schauer, Precedent,
30. See generally Alexander, supra
Precedent, 39 STAN.
(1987).
(1987).
515.
31. See Virginia,
Virginia, 518 U.S. SIS.
31.
32. See Hogan,
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718.
32.
33. See Craig,
Craig,429 U.S. 190.
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Roberts and Justice Alito should suddenly
suddenly discard the first-order
first-order
Roberts
substantive views on
on important
important constitutional
constitutional questions they
they held
substantive
34
34
when
they
were
appointed
to
the
Court. Rather, the precedent-based
precedent-based
COurt.
when
appointed to
complaint
is
that
these
and
other
Justices
should
ignore their
complaint
ignore
precedent-independent views, and instead make
make decisions consistent
precedent-independent
Court's previous decisions
decisions even if their own inclinations and
and
with the Court's
their own analyses would have pointed them in different directions.
In the language of contemporary
contemporary legal
legal theory, the alleged
In
content-independent.35
are content-independent?5
decisis are
stare decisis
and stare
precedent and
constraints of precedent
"Because I said
Just like the exasperated parent who eventually says "Because
so!"
to
a
questioning
so!"
and recalcitrant child, an obligation to follow a
precedent comes from the very status of the precedent as a precedent.
Precedential constraint is thus independent of the putative authorityPrecedential
follower's views about the content (or intrinsic persuasiveness) of the
precedent. Just as rules derive their authority from their status as rules
and not from their content, so too does a precedent derive its
precedential force from its status as a previously decided case, and
precedential
not from
from the power
reasoning or the desirability of its outcome.
not
power of its reasoning
In the particular
of
specifically in the context
context of
particular context of stare decisis, specifically
the
Supreme
Court
of
the
United
States,
the
claim
of
the
Court's
the Supreme
United States,
claim
Court's
current critics is that the current Justices
Justices have an obligation
obligation to follow
the Court's previous
Justices'
current Justices'
the
previous decisions regardless
regardless of the current
views about the current
current correctness
correctness of those decisions.
II. ON
ON THE STRENGTH
STRENGTH OF
OF THE STARE
STARE DECISIS
DECISIS NORM

That there is, by hypothesis,
hypothesis, an obligation of a court
court to follow its
own
previous
decisions
because
of
their
status
status and not because
because of
of
own previous decisions because of
34.
34. Or
Or at
at least
least such
such criticism
criticism is
is not aa part
part of
of the structure
structure of
of a complaint
complaint about
about the
the failure to follow
follow
precedent.
precedent. II do
do not
not mean
mean to
to suggest
suggest that
that those
those who
who criticize
criticize the
the Justices
Justices would
would not
not be
be tickled
tickled if the
the
Justices
Justices they
they are
are criticizing
criticizing simply
simply changed
changed their
their first-order
first-order substantive
substantive views,
views, but
but it seems
seems plain
plain that
that the
criticism
of various
various Justices
Justices for
for not
not following
following precedent
precedent is
is aa rhetorical
rhetorical strategy
strategy employed
employed under
under
criticism of
circumstances
circumstances in
in which
which aa change
change of
ofthose
those Justices'
Justices' substantive
substantive views
views is highly
highly unlikely.
unlikely.
35.
35. See
See H.
H. L.
L. A.
A. HART,
HART, Commands
Commands and
and Authoritative
Authoritative Legal
Legal Reasons,
Reasons, in
in ESSAYS
ESSAYS ON
ON BENTHAM:
BENTHAM:
STUDIES
STUDIES IN
IN JURISPRUDENCE
JURISPRUDENCE AND
AND POLITICAL
POLITICAL THEORY
THEORY 243,
243, 261-66
261-66 (1982);
(1982); Frederick
Frederick Schauer,
Schauer, The
Questions
Questions ofAuthority,
ofAuthority, 81
81 GEO. L.J.
LJ. 95,
95, 96
96 n.6
n.6 (1992).
(1992).
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their content does not mean that the obligation is absolute. Just as the
Protection and Due Process
requirements of Equal Protection
Process may be overcome
overcome
by a governmental
governmental showing of a compelling state interest,36
interest, 36 and just
constraints of the First Amendment
Amendment
as Justice Holmes described
described the constraints
37 so too is
as being overridable
overridable in cases
cases of "clear and present danger,"
danger,,,37
obligations of stare decisis might be
it possible that on occasion the obligations
occasions indicating that there is or was no
overcome without such occasions
continuing obligation to follow earlier
earlier decisions. When the Supreme
sufficiently
Court finds that there exists a governmental
governmental interest sufficiently
compelling to override
the
requirement
of
the
Equal
Protection
Protection
override
8
clause, and when the Court agrees that a compelling interest allows
clause,38
an override
override of what otherwise would have been the requirements of
of
39
the First Amendment,39
Amendment, the equal protection
protection and First Amendment
Amendment
do
not
disappear.
Nor
did
they
disappear
requirements
even in the
requirements
very cases in which the compelling interest arose. Similarly, the
requirements
requirements of stare decisis do not disappear, either for the future or
overridden by particularly powerful
in that case, when they are overridden
reasons for not following a previous decision.
As with the compelling
compelling interest
interest and clear and present danger
standards, however, an overridable obligation can be considered
considered an
override is higher than the
obligation only if the threshold for override
threshold
would
have
been
for
a
decision
of that type absent the
threshold
obligation. Were there no rule of stare decisis, a court would
would
presumably
presumably have the freedom to reject any earlier decision
decision it thought
mistaken. Consequently, if a court under a purported regime of stare
36. See Roe v. Wade,
113, 16~6
165-66 (1973)
Wade, 410
410 U.S. 113,
(1973) (holding a state may place "restrictions on
on
abortion ...
... so long as those restrictions
restrictions are tailored to the recognized
recognized state interests ...
... [and]
[and] provide
compelling
intervention."); Shapiro
(1969) (stating a
U.S. 618, 638
638 (1969)
compelling justifications
justifications for intervention.");
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
restriction
fundamental right "must be judged by
restriction of a fundamental
by the stricter standard of whether
whether it promotes a
compelling state interest."), overruled
overruled on other
othergrounds
in part
grounds in
part by Fed. Election
Election Comm'n
Comm'n v. Wisconsin
Right to Life, Inc., 127 S.
S.Ct. 2652 (2007); Korematsu
Korematsu v. United
United States, 323
323 U.S.
U.S. 214 (1944).
(1944).
37. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S.
U.S. 47, 52 (1919)
(1919) (stating the freedom of speech would not
cover such speech
"substantive evils that
speech that "create[s]
"create[s] a clear and present danger" to cause the "substantive
Congress has a right to prevent.
prevent.").
").
38. See cases cited supra
supra note 36.
39. See New York v. Ferber, 458
U.S. 747, 774
(1982) (O'Connor, 1.,
J., concurring)
concurring) (stating that
458 U.S.
774 (1982)
"compelling interests"
interests" may
may allow
allow "New
ban knowing
works depicting minors
"compelling
"New York
York to
to ban
knowing distribution
distribution of works
conduct," notwithstanding
engaged in explicit sexual
sexual conduct,"
notwithstanding the value that society may place on the works).
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decisis is free to
to disregard any previous decisions it believes wrong,
wrong,
then the
the standard
standard for
for disregarding is the same when
when stare
stare decisis
decisis
as when
when itit does not,
not, and the alleged stare decisis norm turns
applies as
to be
be doing no work. If
If this is so,
so, then stare
stare decisis does not in
out to
fact exist as a norm at all. But if,
if, by contrast, it requires aa better
reason to disregard a mistaken precedent than merely that it is
is
even if it
believed mistaken, aa stare decisis norm can be said to exist even
overridable. In such aa case, however, it would be necessary for the
is overridable.
standard for override to be higher than the standard for reaching the
same outcome absent the precedent. This might be expressed in terms
of a belief that the previous decision is extremely or really really
really wrong, or wrong and extremely harmful, or something of that
variety but, for a norm of stare decisis in fact to exist in a meaningful
variety
way, there must be a gap between what the standard for rejecting a
previous
previous decision
decision would have been without the norm of stare decisis
and what that standard is with a norm of stare decisis. And this gap or
heightened
Supreme Court plainly had in
heightened justification
justification is what the Supreme
' 4° in
mind when it said that it needed a "special
"special justification
justification,,40
order to
disregard
an
earlier
decision,
although
the
question
whether
the
Court
disregard
earlier
whether
meant
meant what it said, or has acted consistently with what it said,
remains
remains to be answered.
answered.
Thus, it is a not a necessary
necessary consequence
consequence of the existence of a
norm of stare decisis that earlier
earlier decisions
decisions never
never be overruled. That
That
41
4
1
42
Brown v. Board
Education overruled
does
Board of
of Education
overruled Plessy v. Ferguson
Ferguson42
not show that stare
Supreme Court
Court is non-existent. It
It
stare decisis on the Supreme
shows
only
that
if
there
is
a
norm
shows only that if
norm of stare decisis, then, unlike
unlike British
British
43
43
practice
prior
to
1965,
it
is
a
non-absolute
norm.
But
for
a
norm
to
practice
1965,
non-absolute
be
be non-absolute
non-absolute and
and still operate
operate as a potentially
potentially decision-influencing
decision-influencing
40.
443 (2000);
40. Dickerson
Dickerson v.
v. United
United States,
States, 530
530 U.S. 428,
428,443
(2000); Arizona
Arizona v.
v. Rumsey,
Rumsey, 467
467 U.S.
U.S. 203,
203, 212
212
(1984).
(1984).
41.
41. Brown
Brown v.
v. Bd.
Bd. of
of Educ.,
Educ., 347
347 U.S. 483,
483, 492-95
492-95 (1954)
(1954) (overruling
(overruling Plessy v. Ferguson
Ferguson after
after
considering
considering public
public education
education and
and "its
"its present
present place
place in
in the
the American
American life
life throughout
throughout the
the Nation.").
Nation.").
42.
42. Plessy
Plessy v.
v. Ferguson,
Ferguson, 163
163 U.S.
U.S. 537
537 (1896).
(1896).
43.
43. Prior
Prior to
to the
the Practice
Practice Statement
Statement on
on Judicial
Judicial Precedent
Precedent of
of 1966,
1966, even
even the
the highest
highest courts
courts in
in Great
Great
Britain
were not
not permitted
permitted to
to overrule
overrule their
their own
own previous
previous decisions,
decisions, such
such an
an act
act being
being deemed
deemed lawlawBritain were
making,
and thus
thus reserved
reserved for
for Parliament.
Parliament. See
See generally
generally CROSS,
CROSS, supra
supra note
note 21.
21.
making, and
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must entail
entail some
some modification
modification of
of the otherwise
otherwise applicable
applicable
norm, itit must
of that norm, and
and that is why, in
decision-making structure
structure because of
decision-making
context, II describe
describe this
this modification
modification as
as a higher
higher threshold
threshold for
for
this context,
disregarding a previous
previous decision
decision than would
would have
have existed
existed without
without the
the
disregarding
stare decisis
decisis norm. It is a highly
highly likely,
likely, but not
not logically
logically necessary,
stare
empirical consequence
consequence of the existence
existence of aa stare
stare decisis norm, that
that
empirical
some decisions
decisions that are followed
followed because of
of
there will exist at least some
norm that would
would not
not otherwise
otherwise be followed, and
and that some wrong
the norm
extremely wrong
wrong decisions
decisions remain on the books, or attract
but not extremely
agreement from those
those who would have decided
decided them differently. If
If in
agreement
the "special
"special justification"
justification" standard
standard is illusory, and if in fact the
fact the
never follow
follow an
an earlier
earlier decision
decision with which
which
Justices never or almost never
Justices
they disagree, then it is hard to conclude that even a non-absolute
actually exists. 44 In theory, stare decisis
decisis could
could
norm of stare decisis actually
norm
exist even though it never
never prevailed, for it might exist as a norm that
in every case
case either produced
produced the same
same result as would have been
been
compelling reasons.
produced
produced without it or was overridden by compelling
DECISIS?
III. Is THERE A
A NoRM
NORM OF STARE
STARE DECISIS?
45 of
of
All of this is by way of attempting to explain what a norm45
stare decisis would look like were one to exist in and for the Supreme
of
Court of the United States. But as we know from the example of
unicorns, it is one thing to explain what something would look like if
it were to exist and another to determine whether it in fact exists or
of
not. So although we now have a pretty good idea of what a norm of
stare decisis would look like and how it would operate were it to
exist, we do not yet know whether it really does exist, or, like
unicorns, has
not a real existence. Consequently, the
conceptual but not
has a conceptual
stare decisis does indeed
whether aa norm of stare
question now before us is whether
to refer to
to some norm being
in this context
context solely to
44.
clear, II use "exists" in
44. As
As should
should by now be clear,
domain. Existence
decision-making domain.
some decision-making
decision-makers in some
group of
of decision-makers
some group
accepted and employed by some
accepted
of
questions of
descriptive notion, unrelated to questions
purely sociologically descriptive
purposes aa purely
for my
my present
present purposes
is
is thus
thus for
theory.
political theory.
or normative political
epistemology or
moral epistemology
the departure
departure
be desirable,
desirable, the
taken to
to be
practice taken
to an
an existing practice
here to refer
refer to
"norm" here
the term "norm"
45. I1 use the
45.
for criticism.
criticism.
thus grounds
grounds for
from
which is thus
from which
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contemporary critics of the Roberts Court assume that a
exist. The contemporary
norm of stare decisis exists, because otherwise the criticism of the
Court for not following it would make no sense. But is there such a
norm? What is the norm that the Roberts Court is in fact
disregarding, where does it come from, and has it existed in the past?
A considerable
considerable number of political scientists have looked at
precisely
precisely this question, and the existing research provides very strong
strong
Supreme Court, there exists
support for the view that, at least in the Supreme
46
46
no strong norm of stare decisis. This reference to a "norm"
"norm" is my
language and not that of the political scientists, but the import of the
the conclusion that
political science research
research lies in its supporting the·
outcomes, previous
among the factors that determine Supreme Court outcomes,
47
47
decisions are rarely among them. The Justices of course do provide
numerous
numerous allegedly
allegedly supporting citations
citations to previous Supreme Court
decisions,
but
the
principal
conclusion
of the empirical
empirical research is
decisions,
principal
that the data do not support
support the traditional
traditional picture about the
48
importance
Rather, it appears
Supreme Court.
COurt. 48
importance of precedent in the Supreme
that the Court's previous decisions only rarely and weakly influence
influence
current
results.
Instead
of
being
causal
of
Supreme
Court
outcomes,
causal
current
the Court's prior decisions appear to provide,
provide, consistent with the

46. See
See Jeffrey
Stare Decisis
Decisis on the Votes o/Supreme
of Supreme
46.
Jeffrey A.
A. Segal
Segal &
& Harold
Harold J.
J. Spaeth,
Spaeth, The Influence of
o/Stare
Court
Justices, 40 AM.
LAWRENCE BAUM, THE
AM. J. POL. SCI. 971,
971, 973,
973, 983-84 (1996).
(1996). See generally
generally LAWRENCE
Court Justices,
PUZZLE OF
& HAROLD 1.
J. SPAETH,
STARE lNDECISIS:
INDECISIS: THE
PUZZLE
OF JUDICIAL
JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR
BEHAVIOR (1997);
(1997); SAUL
SAUL BRENNER
BRENNER &
SPAETH, STARE
ALTERATION OF
1946-1992 (1995);
ALTERATION
OF PRECEDENT
PRECEDENT ON
ON THE
THE SUPREME
SUPREME COURT,
COURT, 1946-1992
(1995); JEFFREY A. SEGAL &
HAROLD
J. SPAETH,
SUPREME COURT AND
ATrITUDINAL MODEL
&
HAROLD J.
SPAETH, THE
THE SUPREME
AND THE
THE ATTITUDINAL
MODEL (1993);
(1993); JEFFREY A. SEGAL
SEGAL &
HAROLD
J. SPAETH,
HAROLD 1.
SPAETH, THE
THE SUPREME
SUPREME COURT
COURT AND
AND THE
THE ATITUDINAL
ATTITUDINAL MODEL
MODEL REVISITED
REVISITED (2002); HAROLD
HAROLD
J. SPAETH
& JEFFREY
MAJORITY RULE
RULE OR
J.
SPAETH &
JEFFREY A.
A. SEGAL,
SEGAL, MAJORITY
OR MINORITY
MINORITY WILL:
WILL: ADHERENCE
ADHERENCE TO PRECEDENT
PRECEDENT ON
ON
THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT
COURT (2001);
& Sangick
Sangick Jeon,
Supreme Court
Court
THE
U.S. SUPREME
(2001); James
James H.
H. Fowler
Fowler &
Jeon, The Authority of
o/Supreme
Precedent,
Precedent, 30
30 SOC.
SOC. NETWORKS
NETWORKS 16
16 (2008). Somewhat
Somewhat more qualified
qualified views can be found in
in LEE
EPSTEIN
EpSTEIN &
& JOSEPH
JOSEPH F.
F. KOBYLKA,
KOBYLKA, THE
THE SUPREME
SUPREME COURT
COURT AND
AND LEGAL
LEGAL CHANGE:
CHANGE: ABORTION
ABORTION AND
AND THE
THE
DEATH
(1992); THOMAS
DEATH PENALTY
PENALTY 5-7
5-7 (1992);
THOMAS G.
G. HANSFORD
HANSFORD &
& JAMES
JAMES F. SPRIGGS
SPRIGGS 11,
11, THE
THE POLITICS
POLITICS OF
OF
PRECEDENT
ON THE
SUPREME COURT 3-12
the Law:
PRECEDENT ON
THE U.S.
U.S. SUPREME
3-12 (2006);
(2006); Paul J. Wahlbeck, The Life of
o/the
Law: Judicial
Judicial
Politics
(1997).
Politics andLegal
and Legal Change,
Change, 59 J.J. POL.
POL. 778,
778, 792-96
792-96 (1997).
47.
47. Although
Although not
not directly
directly relevant
relevant here,
here, it is worth
worth noting
noting that
that under
under Segal
Segal and Spaeth's
Spaeth's "attitudinal"
"attitudinal"
model,
speaking-substantive policy
model, ideology,
ideology, broadly
broadly speaking-substantive
policy views-is
views-is the single greatest
greatest determinant
determinant of the
the
votes
votes of
of the
the Justices.
Justices. See
See generally
generally JEFFREY
JEFFREY A.
A. SEGAL
SEGAL & HAROLD
HAROLD J.
J. SPAETH,
SPAETH, THE
THE SUPREME
SUPREME COURT
COURT AND
AND
THE
THE ATITUDINAL
ATTITUDINAL MODEL
MODEL (1993).
(1993).
48.
COURT: THE
48. See
See generally
generally Anthony
Anthony Lewis,
Lewis, Foreword
Foreword to
to THE
THE BURGER
BURGER COURT:
THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION
COUNTER-REVOLUTION
THAT
THAT WASN'T
WASN'T vii, vii-viii
vii-viii (Vincent
(Vincent Blasi ed.,
ed., 1983).
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standard
general,49
standard Legal Realist picture of the effect
effect of precedent
precedent in general,49
primarily ex post justifications
rationalizations for decisions that
justifications and rationalizations
have actually been reached
reached on grounds other than precedent.
The empirical
empirical research does not support the conclusion, nor does it
claim, that individual Justices
Justices never take the Court's previous rulings
as authoritative, but the research
research is most consistent with the
proposition that the cases in which the Justices
Justices actually follow
precedent are rare, and the cases in which following precedent
precedent is
dispositive are rarer still. So as should be clear by now, the set of
of
cases or opinions
opinions that display genuine constraint by stare decisis will
not include those in which a Justice cites an earlier
earlier decision to
support
what
he
or
she
support
should or would, even absent the previous
case, likely have concluded even absent the earlier
earlier decision. If we
earlier
eliminate these cases and opinions in which the citation of earlier
cases is largely redundant, we find ourselves now searching
searching for
instances in which a Justice voted contrary to his or her precedentindependent beliefs solely because
independent
because of the current felt obligation to
follow precedent. Such instances
instances do exist, but it turns out that they
Griswoldv.
are few and far between. Justice Stewart had dissented
dissented in Griswold
Connecticut,
contained no "general
Connecticut, insisting that the Constitution
Constitution contained
50 but joined the
right of privacy,"
of
privacy,,,50
majority in Roe v. Wade because
because of
what to him was the controlling
controlling force of a case with which he had
51
51 In several
procedure cases of the 1950s and
disagreed.
criminal procedure
1960s, Justice
Harlan
voted
to
apply
earlier decisions
Justice
decisions in which he had
52
been a dissenter,52
dissenter, and Justice White did the same thing when,
53
despite his strong dissent in Miranda
Miranda v. Arizona
Arizona53
in 1966, he voted
49. There are numerous versions
versions of Legal Realism, of course, but aa common theme
theme of much
much of Legal
Realism
Realism isis that the
the stated reasons
reasons for aa decision are
are rarely the
the genuine reasons, as opposed
opposed toto the afterthe-fact
the-fact justifications
justifications for decisions reached on
on other
other and unstated
unstated grounds.
grounds. See JEROME FRANK,
FRANK, LAW
AND
MIND (1930).
WILFRID E. RUMBLE,
REALISM:
AND THE
THE MODERN
MODERN MIND
(1930). See generally
generally WILFRID
RUMBLE, JR.,
JR., AMERICAN
AMERICAN LEGAL
LEGAL REALISM:
SKEPTICISM,
REFORM, AND
AND THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS
PROCESS (1968);
(1968); WILLIAM
SKEPTICISM, REFORM,
THE JUDICIAL
WILLIAM TWINING,
TwINING, KARL
KARL LLEWELLYN
LLEWELLYN AND
AND

THE REALIST MOVEMENT (1973).
50.
(1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
50. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
U.S. 479,
479, 530 (1965)
dissenting).
51.
Roe v.
v. Wade,
410 U.S.
U.S. 113,168,170
113, 168, 170 (1973)(Stewart,
(1973) (Stewart, 1.,
J., concurring).
concurring).
51. Roe
Wade, 410
52. See Henry J. Bourguignon, The Second Mr.
Mr. Justice
His Principles
Decision
Justice Harlan:
Harlan: His
Principles ofJudicial
Judicial Decision
Making,
CT. REV.
REv. 251,
251, 279.
279.
Making, 1979 SUP. CT.
(1966).
53. Miranda v.v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 504 (1966).
THE REALIST MOVEMENT (1973).
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in 1980 in Edwards
Edwards v. Arizona to extend Miranda's
Miranda's ban on police
questioning after a suspect had invoked his Miranda
Mirandarights. Similarly,
questioning
Justice Scalia
Scalia has been willing, on stare
stare decisis grounds, to apply the
dormant commerce
commerce clause
clause to invalidate explicitly
explicitly protectionist
protectionist
legislation, even though he himself believes the so-called dormant
dormant
commerce
commerce clause
clause has no basis in the text or history of the
55 a case applying Apprendi v.
54 And in Ring v. Arizona,
Arizona,55
Constitution. 54
56
New Jersey,
Jersey,56 Justice Kennedy, in a concurring
concurring opinion, thought it
"[t]hough it is still my view that Apprendi v.
important to note that "[t]hough
Jersey ....
Apprendi is now the law, and
New Jersey
.. was wrongly
wrongly decided, Apprendi
57
principled
a
in
implemented
be
its holding must implemented in a principled way.",
way. ,,57
There
There are undoubtedly
undoubtedly other examples, to be sure, but it is
interesting that this brief list may well constitute a quite large
percentage,
percentage, at least for the fifty-five years from the beginning of the
Warren
Warren Court era, of the entirety of such cases. When requested to
think of cases in which a Supreme Court Justice who had voted one
way on an issue, or was known to have certain first-order views about
constitutional issue, subsequently
some constitutional
subsequently voted the other way because
because
of the obligation to follow a precedent
precedent with which he or she had
disagreed, numerous colleagues
colleagues at multiple institutions were
unanimous
unanimous in concluding that there were very few. Indeed, the
foregoing list is pretty much all that these various colleagues
colleagues could
unambiguous
think of, at least in terms of providing crisp and unambiguous
examples in which a Justice known from his or her opinions or extrajudicial
judicial writings to believe one proposition or conclusion
conclusion had voted
of the felt obligation to follow an
contrary to those beliefs because
58
of the
earlier decision
decision of
the Court.
Court. 58

54. See W. Lynn Creamery
209-10 (1994)
J., concurring);
concurring); see also
Creamery v. Healy,
Healy, 512 U.S. 186,
186,209-10
(\994) (Scalia, 1.,
Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 610 (1997)
(1997) (Thomas,
J., joined by
by
Camps Newfound/Owatonna,
(Thomas, J.,joined
Scalia, J.,
(1988).
Scalia,
J., dissenting);
dissenting); New Energy Co. of Ind.
Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273-74
273-74 (\988).
55. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 613 (2002).
56. Apprendi
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
57. Ring, 536 U.S. at 613 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
reliable research
research method, but it is
58. I do not claim that asking one's friends or colleagues is a reliable
difficult to prove a negative,
negative, and thus an otherwise
otherwise lazy
lazy (but nevertheless
nevertheless common)
common) research approach
occasionally has its advantages.
occasionally
advantages.
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instances of genuine stare decisis influence are so rare is
That such instances
Supreme
underscored by the ubiquity of the opposite phenomenon. Supreme
their
Court Justices whose views have been rejected by a majority of their
colleagues
overwhelmingly
continue
to
adhere
to
those
outvoted
colleagues overwhelmingly
outvoted
subsequent cases-the
dissentcases-the phenomenon
phenomenon of persistent dissentviews in subsequent
thus in effect rejecting the idea of stare decisis and rejecting
rejecting the
59
constraints
example, the opinions of
of
constraints of precedent. Consider, for example,
Justices
subsequent to the
Justices Brennan and Marshall in obscenity
obscenity cases subsequent
60
Paris Adult
Miller v. California
Calijornia 6o
and Paris
landmark 1973 decisions in Miller
61
61
Theatre II v. Slaton.
Slaton. In Miller
Miller and Paris
Paris Adult Theatre,
Theatre, Justice
Justice
Theatre
62
Brennan, himself the author in Roth v.
v. United
United States
States of the Supreme
legally
approach allowing
allowing the regulation of legally
Court's "non-speech"
"non-speech" approach
defined
Amendment objections,
defined obscenity in the face of First Amendment
dissented, concluding
concluding that the approach he had earlier created had
proved unworkable
constitutionally
unworkable in practice
practice and created constitutionally
impermissible
vagueness
problems
with
a
consequent
impermissible
problems
consequent chilling effect
effect
63
63
on constitutionally
constitutionally protected
protected material.
materia1.
Justice Brennan's dissenting position in the 1973
1973 obscenity cases
cases is
a plausible one-indeed, it may even be right-but it did not
command
command a majority
majority of the Court. Yet for Justice Brennan, the
Court's majority opinions in these cases did not compel him to follow
them, and he continued to dissent in any subsequent
subsequent obscenity case in
64
which an obscenity
conviction under it was upheld.64
And,
obscenity law or a conviction
indeed, Justice Brennan
had,
to
his
credit,
written
thoughtfully
and
Brennan
65
65
dissent.
persistent
of
practice of persistent dissent.
own practice
his own
of his
forcefully in justification
justification of
59. See generally
generally Earl
Death of Stare
Stare Decisis
Constitutional
Earl M. Maltz, Some Thoughts on the Death
Decisis in Constitutional
Law, 1980 WIS.
WIs. L. REv.
REv. 467.
467. For an earlier
earlier plea that Supreme Court
Court Justices engage unashamedly
unashamedly in just
Stare Decisis,
(1949). See also
O. Douglas, Stare
DeCisis, 49 COLUM.
COLUM. L. REv.
REv. 735 (1949).
this practice, see generally William 0.
Justice
(1944).
Justice Reed's opinion
opinion in Smith v. Allright, 321 U.S. 649,665 (1944).
60. Millerv.
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
(1973).
(1973).
61. Paris Adult Theater II v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
62. Roth v. United
United States,
States, 354
354 U.S. 476, 469 (1957).
(1957).
Theatre1,
413 U.S. at 73-74, 91 (Brennan,
63. Paris
Paris Adult Theatre
1,413
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
291,
64. See,
See. e.g., Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 506-07 (1987);
(1987); Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291,
311 (1977);
(1977); Hamling
Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S.
U.S. 87,
87, 142
142 (1974). And this list of cases excludes
excludes a far
more substantial number of dissents from denials of certiorari
certiorari in which the Court refused
refused to review
review
obscenity convictions.
ofDissents,
HASTINGS LJ.
L.J. 427,
65. William J. Brennan, Jr.,
Jr., In Defense of
Dissents, 37 HASTINGS
427, 427, 436-37 (1986).
(1986).
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I use this example
example precisely because
because it is so crisp. The
constitutional rule-legally defined obscenity is outside of the
coverage of the First Amendment-to
Amendment-to which Justice Brennan
Brennan refused
refused
created
to give stare decisis effect, was just the one he himself had created
sixteen years earlier in Roth, and which he subsequently rejected in
Miller
Miller for reasons of practical unworkability
unworkability rather than fundamental
theoretical
error.
And
although
reasonable minds can differ on this
theoretical
question, the written, printed, and photographic
photographic materials at issue in
in
these cases, the materials
refused
materials in defense of which Justice Brennan refused
to apply the principle
hardly be thOUght
thought of as
principle of stare decisis, could
66
values. 66
speech values.
free speech
of free
lying at the center of
I do not want to single
single out Justice Brennan unfairly. His behavior
behavior
-which to his credit he was willing to explain
-which
explain and justify-was
entirely
entirely consistent with that of almost all of his colleagues
colleagues almost all
of the time. That same behavior of persisting in dissent is seen in
many dissenting Justices, who continue
adhere to their dissents,
continue to adhere
and do not take -supposed
-supposed norms of stare
stare decisis notwithstandingnotwithstandinga majority decision of the Court to have reason-giving
reason~giving or decisionguiding effect. 67
If
one
looks
at actual Supreme
67
Supreme Court practice,
therefore, one is forced to conclude
that
there
is hardly any existing
conclude
norm of stare decisis on the Supreme Court. This conclusion is based
not on any single form of research, and each of these forms has its
based on the
undeniable flaws. My conclusion, however, is based
confluence
of
the empirical
empirical research
research by political scientists, the
confluence
outcome-changing precedential
precedential effect
effect
paucity of crisp examples of outcome-changing
for individual Justices, the phenomenon
phenomenon of persistent dissent, and the
66. And
And in
in this
respect these
cases differ
from the
the death
death penalty
66.
this respect
these cases
differ from
penalty cases, in which Justices Brennan and
Marshall were also persistent
consequences of death make
persistent dissenters, but in which the very consequences
make it maximally
maximally
plausible for
for aa dissenter
dissenter from
generally
plausible
from the
the death
death penalty
penalty to
to adhere
adhere to that dissenting position. See generally
Michael Mello, Adhering to Our
Our Views: Justices
and Marshall
Marshalland the Relentless Dissent
to
Justices Brennan
Brennan and
Dissent to
Death as a Punishment,
Punishment, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
(1995); Laura
and the
Death
REv. 592 (1995);
Laura K. May, Justice
Justice Brennan
Brennan and
Jurisprudence
(1988).
Jurisprudence of Dissent,
Dissent, 61 TEMP.
TEMP. L. REV.
REv. 307 (1988).
generally Maurice Kelman, The Forked
ForkedPath
CT. REv.
REV. 227; Earl M.
67. See generally
Path of Dissent,
Dissent, 1985 Sup.
SUP. Cr.
Maltz, No Rules in aa Knife Fight:
Fight: Chief
Chief Justice
Rehnquist and the Doctrine
Decisis, 25
Justice Rehnquist
Doctrine of Stare
Stare Decisis,
25
L.J. 669 (1994);
Decisis and Constitutional
ConstitutionalAdjudication,
RUTGERS LJ.
(1994); Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare
Stare Decisis
Adjudication, 88
88
COLUM. L. REV.
(1988); Henry P. Monaghan, Taking Supreme Court
Court Opinions
Opinions Seriously,
Seriously, 39 MD. L.
COLUM.
REv. 723 (1988);
REV. I1 (1979).
(1979).
REv.
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explicit
explicit rejection
rejection of the stare decisis norm by Justices such as Justice
mutually-reinforcing sources of data pointing
Scalia. With all of these mutually-reinforcing
in the same direction,
direction, it is hard to resist the conclusion
conclusion that the norm
the current
current Court is commonly
commonly accused of rejecting is one that
appears now not to exist and that appears not to have existed for at
least several
several generations.
VALUE OF STARE
IV. ON THE VALUE
STARE DECISIS

That there has been
been for more than fifty years scarcely any extant
68-very little
stare decisis norm in the Supreme
-very
felt obligation to
Supreme Court68
follow precedent
precedent just because it is precedent
precedent and not because the
precedent
correct-is hardly an oversight. Justice
precedent is believed to be correct-is
Scalia has been
been most explicit in explaining
explaining his refusal to accept
accept such a
69 arguing that his oath requires him to interpret
norm,
norm,69
interpret and obey the
Constitution and not others'
others' views about the Constitution. He has thus
consistently argued that he was appointed by the President and
confirmed by the Senate to give his views, and not the views of his
confirmed
predecessors.
predecessors. This position is a bit question-begging
question-begging because the view
that a Justice is expected to express his or her own views is not
inconsistent with the position that one's own views can
inconsistent
can incorporate
deference to the views of others or deference
deference to
one's own views about deference
earlier decisions. Contrary to Justice Scalia's conclusion, the view that
the oath of office
office requires following the Constitution
Constitution is open to the
interpretation that stare decisis is sufficiently part of the Constitution
Constitution
itself, or that a judicial method incorporating
itself,
incorporating stare decisis is
sufficiently part of the Constitution itself (and was in 1789 when
Article
Article III was adopted), that rejection of stare decisis is not required
by the oath of office. Still, Justice Scalia's point is plain enough, and
underscores the fact that a norm of stare decisis is, in important
underscores
respects, counter-intuitive.
counter-intuitive. It is hardly self-evident
self-evident that requiring a
& Sangick
Sangick Jeon, The Authority of Supreme Court Precedent,
68. See James H. Fowler &
Precedent, 30
30 Soc.
SOC.
NETWORKS
NETWORKS 16
16 (2008).
See, e.g.,
also
69. See,
e.g., South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 825
825 (1989)
(1989) (Scalia,
(Scalia, J., dissenting);
dissenting); see also
(1992) (Scalia, J.,
Planned Parenthood
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 993 (1992)
1., dissenting).

Published by Reading Room, 2008
HeinOnline -- 24 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 397 2007-2008

17

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 6
398

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY
UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol.
(Vol. 24:381

judge
all-things-considered judgment to
judge to suppress his or her own best all-things-considered
perspective)
the dead hand of the past or to the (from his or her perspective)
erroneous views of one's historical colleagues is sensible. And it is
likely to appear particularly non-sensible to the judge at precisely the
moment when following the stare decisis norm will direct that judge to
make what he or she believes to be wrong decision.
There
arguments going the other way, arguments
There are, of course, arguments
of
that make stare decisis appear
appear less counter-intuitive. Thus, a norm of
70
grounds.
different
several
of
any
on
defended
be
might
stare decisis
defended on any of several different grounds. 7o
Most common would be one or another
another variety of the position that
law is the special steward
steward of stability for stability's sake, consistency
consistency
consistency's sake, and settlement for settlement's
settlement's sake; a
for consistency's
expressed by Justice Brandeis in Burnet v.
v.
position most famously expressed
71
7
1
Coronado
Oil
&
Gas
Co.
where
Brandeis
memorably
stated
that
"in
Coronado Oil & Gas CO.
memorably
most matters it is more important that the applicable
applicable rule of law be
72
right.,
settled
be
it
settled than that be settled right.,,72
73 made clear some
Payne v. Tennessee 73
As the clash of opinions
opinions in Payne
some
years ago, it is not self-evident
self-evident that Justice Brandeis's
position
in
Brandeis's
Coronado
Coronado Oil is as attractive outside the realm of commercial
commercial and
related issues as within. Nor is it self-evident
self-evident that on issues involving
Casey, 505 U.S. at 845-46 (applying the doctrine of stare decisis where a prior decision was
70. See Casey,
still workable
(1991) (stating
workable and its basis had not changed);
changed); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808,
808, 827-28 (1991)
stare
command" and overturning precedent is proper
"when governing
governing
stare decisis
decisis is "not an inexorable
inexorable command"
proper "when
decisions are unworkable or are badly reasoned"); Patterson
172
McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164,
164, 172
Patterson v. McLean
(1989)
"special force in the area of statutory
[where]1
(1989) (holding stare decisis has "special
statutory interpretation
interpretation .
. .
. .
. [where
Congress remains free to alter what we have done."); Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health,
Health, Inc.,
Inc., 462
462
U.S. 416,
(reaffirming Roe v. Wade and stating "slare
"staredecisis,
entirely
decisis, while perhaps never entirely
416, 420 (1983)
(1983) (reaffirming
persuasive
persuasive on a constitutional
constitutional question, is a doctrine
doctrine that demands respect in a society governed
governed by the
law.").
rule of
oflaw.").
71.
Bumet v. Coronado
& Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393,
71. Burnet
Coronado Oil &
393, 406 (1932)
(1932) (Brandeis,
(Brandeis, J.,
1., dissenting).
72. Id.
[d.
(1991) (overruling
73. Payne v. Tennessee,
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808,
808, 829-30, 850, 859 (1991)
(ovenuling its prior decisions in
Booth
Booth v. Maryland
Maryland and South Carolina v. Gathers and holding that evidence
evidence relating to a murder victim
victim
and the impact
sentencing hearing);
id.at 842-43
impact on the victim's family was admissible at a capital
capital sentencing
hearing); id.
(Souter, J.,
J., concurring) (finding
(finding precedent
precedent in the Court's
Court's stare decisis that decisions "wrongly
"wrongly decided,
...call[] for some further action by the Court
Court...
unworkable
... not to compound
compound the original
original error, but to
to
unworkable ...
overrule
id.at 848 (Marshall,
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating the "ovenuling
"overruling of one of this
ovenule the precedent."); id.
Court's
id.at 859 (Stevens, J.,
J.,
Court's precedents
precedents ought to be a matter of great moment and consequence."); id.
dissenting) (claiming the "majority
"majority has obviously been moved by an argument
argument that has strong political
appeal
appeal but no proper place
place in a reasoned
reasoned judicial
judicial opinion.").
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or
morally or politically important individual rights that we can or
should expect Supreme
Supreme Court Justices
Justices to suppress their own best
constitutional judgment
moral, political, and constitutional
judgment to the values of stability,
notice, reliance, or simply being consistent
consistent with the past. But
regardless of whether
in
the
final
analysis
that position-that
whether
position-that stare
decisis has little place in the Supreme
Supreme Court-is
Court-is correct or not, it is
quite plain that it is the position that has prevailed
prevailed on the Supreme
Court at least since the days of Chief Justice Earl Warren,
Warren, and in all
likelihood
for
some
time
before
that
as
well.
likelihood
A LIMITED
LIMITED CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION

My conclusion
conclusion that precedent has rarely genuinely mattered
mattered in the
Supreme Court, as opposed to being a causally
makeweight
causally inert makeweight
Supreme
phrase, and as opposed
opposed to largely causally inert citations to previous
decisions, should not be taken as a claim
claim about courts in general, or
about stare decisis in general, or about precedent in general. Because
Supreme Court's docket is dominated
exceptionally
the Supreme
dominated by cases of exceptionally
consequence, the Supreme Court
high moral, political, and policy consequence,
may actually
be
the
last
place
to
look
to find actual traces of stare
actually
searching for stare decisis, it is likely far more
decisis. If we are searching
momentous cases
cases in the state
fruitful to look at the mine run of less momentous
courts and in the lower federal courts, for that is where a larger
percentage of the docket is comprised
percentage
comprised of more routine cases
of
involving neither individual
individual rights nor fundamental
fundamental questions of
governmental structure, and thus where the values of consistency for
governmental
consistency's sake may be seen to be comparatively
comparatively more important.
consistency's
In addition, the Supreme
Supreme Court's control of its own docket and its
very
limited
number
of cases-only
seventy-three decided
very limited
cases-only seventy-three
decided with full
petitions in the 2006
arguments and opinions out of almost 9000 petitions
74
-is such that very few cases truly presenting stare decisis
Term -is
simply
opportunities will be part
part of the Court's business at all. Cases simply
74. To be exact, the Court in the 2006 Term was asked
asked to decide 8902 cases, of which it decided 278
summarily without opinion and seventy-three
seventy-three with
Court, 2005
with full signed opinions. The Supreme Court,
Term--The Statistics,
Term-The
Statistics, 121
121 HARV.
HARv. L. REv.
REv. 436 (2006).
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raising the same questions as earlier will not be heard at all, and thus
the set of cases that actually are heard is a set in which it will be
extremely rare for there to be cases presenting the exact same
question as one that had been presented at some earlier
earlier time. The
Supreme
Supreme Court's output of cases decided by full opinion after
after
briefing and argument is highly unrepresentative
unrepresentative of law generally and
of
even of constitutional
constitutional law particularly. Instead, the Court's output of
decisions is an output consisting almost entirely of cases
cases that found
their way onto the pinnacle of American
American adjudication
adjudication precisely
precisely
because
because there was no law or because the law was virtually in
75 As a result, the cases in
equipoise between
between the opposing positions. 75
this small and unrepresentative
unrepresentative set are those, especially given the
confluence of high political and moral stakes with the constitutional
or legal indeterminacy
indeterminacy of these cases, in which the constraints of law,
including but not limited to the constraints of a norm of stare decisis,
are at a low ebb.76
76
Although it would therefore
therefore be an error to generalize from the
Supreme Court's longstanding and substantial neglect of the
precedential
precedential effect of its own previous
previous decisions
decisions to a conclusion
conclusion
about the existing practices
practices of courts and judges in general, the
Supreme Court not only has a special visibility, it has a special
visibility as a court. Whether the Supreme Court's docket is actually
actually
generally or the business
generally is a
business of courts generally
representative of law generally
different question
question from whether
whether significant
significant numbers
numbers of people might
not see the Court and its work as more representative
representative than it is, and
Supreme Court is more
thus infer, even if erroneously, that the Supreme
similar to other courts than it is different. Consequently, the Supreme
Court, even if unwittingly, likely serves as an exemplar for the
75. See Frederick
Judging in a Corner
1727-28
Frederick Schauer, Judging
Comer of the Law, 61 S.
s. CAL. L. REV.
REv. 1717, 1727-28
(1988).
(1988).
76. I also make no claim here that stare decisis plays no role in the Court's decisions
decisions about which
plausible that stare decisis is a much larger
larger factor in the decision
decision to deny
deny
cases to take. It seems plausible
granted. But it is also plausible
plausible
certiorari than it is for the decision of the cases for which certiorari is granted.
weakness of the stare
stare decisis norm for cases
cases subject to full briefing and argument,
that, knowing
knowing of the weakness
Justices will rarely vote against certiorari
certiorari solely
solely on stare decisis grounds. As between these two
nothing more
competing hypotheses, my hunch is that the latter is more likely true, but I offer this as nothing
than an unsupported hunch.
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political
political branches and for the larger public of what courts do and
what methods of reasoning they employ
employ in doing it.
The evidence indicates that the Supreme
Supreme Court's current critics are
mistaken
mistaken in claiming
claiming the Roberts Court is in some way taking stare
predecessors on the Warren, Burger,
decisis less seriously than did its predecessors
777
7
and Rehnquist
Rehnquist Courts. That is not to say it might not be desirable
not only for the Roberts
Roberts Court but also for the Supreme Court of the
future to take stare decisis more seriously than has been the case for a
long time, and thus to value stability, consistency,
consistency, settlement,
reliance, notice, and predictability
predictability more than do other governmental
governmental
decision-making
bodies.
Even
if
the
critics
are
criticizing
decision-making
criticizing the Court
from the perch
perch of a largely
largely non-existent norm, the current period, one
in which the Court and its role are undergoing a substantial
transformation in the public's eye, may nevertheless prove to be an
transformation
opportune
opportune moment for the Court's longstanding and arguably
arguably
subjected to some entirely
troubling disregard
disregard for precedent to be subjected
entirely
appropriate,
appropriate, long needed, and hopefully less ideologically
ideologically or
politically motivated, critical commentary.

77. At times the claim
additional mistake of claiming
claim of ignoring precedent makes the additional
claiming that the
Roberts Court is ignoring
acknowledging
ignoring the precedents that the critic happens
happens to prefer
prefer without acknowledging
precedents going in the opposite direction. Ronald
Ronald Dworkin, for example, in Dworkin,
Dworkin, supra
supra note
note 2,
chastises the Court
Morse v. Frederick,
Ct. 2618 (2007),
Court in Morse
Frederick, 127
127 S. Ct.
(2007), for ignoring the holding in Tinker v.
Des Moines Indep.
Indep. Sch. Dist., 393
speaker in a public
393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969),
(1969), in ruling against the student speaker
school free speech case. Dworkin is correct
Frederickis in some tension
correct that the result in Frederick
tension with the result
result
Tinker, but the opposite
in Tinker,
opposite result in Frederick
Frederick would have
have been in just as much
much tension with the more
recent Hazelwood School Dist.
v. Kuhlmeier,
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S.
U.S. 260, 276 (1988)
Dist. v.
(1988) (holding a principal's decision
that the "need to protect the privacy of individuals
individuals...
... within [a]
[a] school
school community" did not violate
violate the
First Amendment),
Amendment), and Bethel Sch.
Sch. Dist.
No. 403 v.
v. Fraser,
U.S. 675, 685 (1986)
Dist. No.
Fraser, 478 U.S.
(1986) (holding school
officials
speech..,
undermine the school's basic
officials may determine
detennine that "to permit
pennit a vulgar and lewd speech
... would undennine
educational mission" and thus does not violate
Dworkin
educational
violate First Amendment rights), neither of which Dworkin
mentions. Plausible arguments
arguments can be made
Tinker,
made that it would
would have been better in Frederick
Frederick to follow Tinker,
thus treating the Hazelwood
and Bethel precedents
conflicting
Hazelwood and
precedents more casually. But given the array of conflicting
precedents,
criticizing the Frederick
Frederickmajority for ignoring precedent, as such, seems considerably more
precedents, criticizing
than the evidence can sustain.
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